This paper describes the causes and consequences of Ireland's economic crisis in the context of the policy solution implemented to contain that crisis: protracted fiscal austerity. I describe the causes of the recent crisis in Ireland, and look at the logic of austerity with a simple model. I compare the current crisis to the crisis of the 1980s, when fiscal austerity was touted as the trigger for the Celtic Tiger. I discuss the measures implemented to date in the current crisis, tracing their effects on sectors of Ireland's macroeconomy, and, finally, ask whether Ireland is, indeed, the role model for fiscal austerity in the Eurozone and beyond. JEL Codes: E00; E30; E62; E63.
Ireland" (Trichet, 2011) .
When the ratings agency Moody's downgraded Ireland's credit rating to junk status in July 2011, they explained what was need to change the ratings again: "upward pressure on the rating could develop if the government's continued success in achieving its fiscal consolidation targets, supported by a resumption of sustained economic growth, is able to reverse the current debt dynamics, thereby sustainably improving the Irish government's financial strength" (Moody's, 2011) .
This paper looks at the logic, theory, and evidence for the two statements above, and asks whether Ireland's approach to austerity really is a role model for small countries experiencing fiscal imbalances, balance sheet crises, and banking crises.
The goal of the paper is to answer this question by looking at the theory surrounding austerity measures in the Irish case, examining the empirical evidence for those claims, and making a historical comparison to the last Irish experience of austerity in the 1980s. Ireland's general government debt (GGD) has increased by 320% over the same period. The level of national debt has increased rapidly as a result of successive bank bailouts, allied to the budget deficits associated with running a pro--cyclical taxation and expenditure mix.
Bank bailouts alone accounted for 14.5% of nominal GDP in 2009 and 32% of nominal GDP in 2010 (Kinsella and Lyons, 2011 There has been a collapse of private credit into the economy. Banks are deleveraging, suddenly unable to access interbank funding, and dependent on liquidity from the ECB to remain nominally solvent. Figure 1 below shows the contraction of credit in Ireland quite starkly. The drop in consumption and investment following the bursting of the property bubble in late 2007, allied to drops in capital spending by the government, and the ramping up of national debt, both private and public, has resulted in the Irish economy's highly fragile state. (Honohan, 2010; Regling and Watson, 2010; Nyberg, 2011) .
Balance sheet effects on Irish banks and the State
In some sense, the balance sheet is the fundamental object in economics.
As Minsky (1975, p. 118) has written, "an ultimate reality in a capitalist economy is the set of interrelated balance sheets among the various units, so that one way every economic unit can be characterized is by its portfolio: the set of tangible and financial assets it owns and the financial liabilities on which it owes". (almost 19% when those indirectly employed are included), and generated 18% of tax revenues (Gurdgiev et al, 2011 ). Ireland's construction boom and bust is a classic asset price boom described by a Minsky cycle (Kelly 2007 , Kinsella, 2010 .
When the unstable investment process eventually collapsed, Ireland's banks' balance sheets were where the damage was most obvious.
The first Figure 3 shows the year on year percentage change in the numbers of customer loans of three of Ireland's largest (and most wayward) banks. Clearly credit constraints are and will be a problem for a small economy whose banks are deleveraging as a result of mandated austerity measures. It should also be noted that the simple austerity logic described above also breaks down in the presence of a credit constraint. almost €70billion into its banking system, the balance sheet of the Irish state is in rough repair. By guaranteeing existing senior bonds and some types of subordinated debt, the capacity to allocate some part of the ultimate loan losses to bondholders was compromised, raising the ultimate cost to the taxpayer of resolving the banking crisis and contaminating the public balance sheet with private assets and liabilities. This emergency funding is contingent on a series of austerity measures, detailed below, designed to correct the primary fiscal imbalance, cleanse wayward bank's balance sheets, repay senior and subordinated bondholders in these banks, and finally, introduce a series of supply--side measures designed to improve relative wage competitiveness in the economy (Kinsella and Leddin, 2010; Lane, 2011; Lucey et al, 2011 ).
Summary of Irish austerity measures
The conditionality surrounding Ireland's loan agreement from the EU and IMF entailed a series of austerity measures over a four--year period. The
International Monetary Fund's Memorandum of Understanding (IMF, 2010) sets out, in detail, the austerity measures the Irish will undertake until 2014. Briefly, they fall under the following categories and sub--categories.
1. Fiscal consolidation.
a. Taxes are to be raised. Carbon, property, and water taxes are to be introduced, a lowering of personal income tax bands and credits is to be pursued.
b. Government expenditure, including social protection expenditure and numbers of public sector workers is to be reduced. b. There will be a reorganisation of the banking sector.
Smaller banks are being merged with larger 'pillar' banks.
c. Increases in Tier 1 capital ratios of 'pillar' banks. The next section examines the theory driving this debate using a simple model.
Theory of austerity
The simple macroeconomic logic underpinning this logic stems from the postulates of Says' law-that supply creates its own demand. Imagine an economy operating below its 'natural' or 'warranted' rate of output, with a government running a budget deficit. The government reduces spending from G to G', and increases taxes from T to T'.
The decrease in government spending lowers aggregate demand, of course, and output decreases. The aggregate supply curve also shifts backwards, reducing the prices of inputs and lowering the level of inflation. In the medium term, due to the economy--wide deflation, productive resources become more attractive as investment options, and so investment increases.
The deficit reduction leads pari passu to an increase in investment. There are multiplier effects on this increase in investment in the long run, of which more in a moment. In the long run, standard macroeconomic theory holds that output is dependent on the rate of capital accumulation. If the lower budget deficit leads to an increase in investment, then it will lead to a higher capital stock, and hence to a higher rate of output. It is worth spending some time writing down a simple model of this theory, because this model drives the policy propositions that follow.
A simple exposition of Irish austerity logic
There is a simple linear model following any introductory macroeconomics textbook, but based on Hansen (1951) , used to convince the reader that reducing the discretionary budget deficit is the only path to fiscal sustainability. The deficit D is given as the gap between government expenditures, G and taxes, T.
The government wishes to control the ratio of the deficit as a percentage of GDP, defined as (D/Y). If the deficit reduction has an effect on the economy, it must be through an automatic stabilizer. Consider the following model:
The first equation describes output as a function of the value of output in a given year and the value of the deficit. The relationship between the value of output and the deficit is captured in the multiplier x.
The second equation relates the deficit in the first year (0) to the level of output through an automatic stabilizer x, which depends negatively on output.
Solving this model by combining the two equations yields:
We can easily see the effect of a change in the deficit via the equation below. We would like to see what happens when we increase the deficit by some amount so:
It is easiest to see the effects when the model is in equilibrium. The equilibrium deficit--to--output ratio is * *
By partially differentiating with respect to the deficit level, we can see the effect of increasing the deficit relative to output.
Equation (7) states that any increase in the deficit will tend to increase the overall level of the deficit, as well as the rate of accumulation of the deficit, for any non--negative choice of multiplier/stabilizer parameter. Conversely, any reduction of the deficit will reduce the overall level of the deficit and its share as a percentage of output. Following on from this, the logic of austerity holds that deficit reduction is both a necessary and sufficient condition for growth.
This simple presentation holds the values of the taxation and government spending multipliers equal to one another, ignores non--linearities, ignores interest servicing on the debt, and, crucially, ignores credit constraints.
We can see that once any debt threshold is introduced (perhaps due to funding constraints, as we have experienced in Ireland), the properties of the model break down quite quickly. The model is however robust to other challenges, such as changes in parameter values for x and y, particularly.
The Keynesian logic for fiscal expansion during a protracted downturn can also be applied to this model, but are only effective in their medium--term or long--term guises. When policy makers raise unemployment initially via austerity cuts in government spending, some of that increased unemployment becomes structural unemployment. Call the share of unemployment that does so s. When the economy is far from its equilibrium position, an austerity program today worsens the long--run debt--and--deficit picture if the following inequality holds:
where x is the multiplier as above, y is the marginal effect of a change in government debt serving on output (the automatic stabilizer from equation 1 above), s is the share of the cyclical recession rise in unemployment becomes a permanent rise in unemployment, r is the real interest rate on government debt, and g is the real growth rate of output. If, for example, x.y were 0.7, and r was less than 1.25% per year, as we have in the Eurozone at the moment, this means that fiscal contraction is bad for the long--run debt--and--deficit right now as long as s + g > 1.5%.
As long as the sum of the economy's long--term growth rate, and the share of a rise in unemployment that becomes structural is greater than 1.5%, fiscal contraction is of questionable benefit to the economy.
The theoretical underpinnings described above find their way quickly to policy prescriptions in the form of an expansionary fiscal contraction'.
Proponents of this theory propose that fiscal contraction, rather than leading to a decline in output, as might be expected, will result in higher output due to its medium term effects on private sector expectations --consumers and investors anticipate long--run tax reductions because of cuts in expenditure, then they may increase expenditure now and so off--set the demand--side effects of the scale of the contraction.
A modern exposition of this proposition can be found in Alesina, Perotti, and Tavares (1998, pg. 200) "Empirical work on the effects and sustainability of fiscal adjustments has consistently reached two conclusions. First, long--lasting adjustments rely mostly (or exclusively) on spending cuts, in particular, in government wages and social security and welfare; by contrast, short--lived adjustments rely mostly on revenue increases. Second, fiscal adjustments are not always associated with reduced growth, or with deterioration in the macroeconomic environment in general."
They continue on page 213: "Fiscal adjustments that rely on cuts in government transfers and wages and are implemented in periods of fiscal stress are long lasting and not contractionary. On the demand side, the expansionary aspect of such fiscal adjustments works through an expectation effect, which is stronger the worse are initial fiscal conditions. On the supply side, the interaction of certain types of adjustment -those without tax increases but with cuts in government employment and wages -lead to wage moderation, reduced unit labor costs, and increases in profitability, business investment, and production." Similar findings are expressed in Alesina and Ardagana (1998) , though they become nuanced in Perotti (2011) . That Alesina et. al slightly hedge their bets in the quote above ("not always associated with reduced growth") should give us pause, especially when other authors are even more hesitant.
In a large panel study, Hogan (2004, pg. 647) claims that, while there is evidence that private consumption rises, it is usually not sufficient to offset the reduction on output: ". . . fiscal contractions are not literally expansionary". Prammer (2004, pg. 50 Finally, the average industrial wage rose by over 14% in the period 1986--1989, or an annual average of 4.6%. Public sector pay rose by a similar level.
These wage increases had a two--fold effect: they boosted government revenue, and increased economic activity through increased private consumption. Rather than being a role model of expansionary fiscal contraction, the 1986--1990 period looks more like a proto--Keynesian story, where a laggard country converges 1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990 rapidly to OECD averages of per capita consumption, output, and (real) growth (Honohan and Walsh 2002, Honohan and Leddin 2006) .
Ireland cannot devalue its currency in 2011 or 2012. There will be no windfalls in taxation revenue or opening up of new markets, and both current and capital expenditures are to be reduced over a five to ten year period to achieve a positive primary balance. With the cost of debt servicing rising over time, and with increasing pressure on social transfers, austerity polices will concentrate on large cuts to pay and pensions and social welfare transfers.
Unlike the 1980s, it will not be enough just to halt the rise in real non--interest spending.
The Bank for International Settlements (2010) estimate that the average primary balance required to stabilise the public debt/GDP ratio at the 2007 level is 5.4% annually for 10 years. The high levels of post--crisis absolute public and private debt will exacerbate any desired fiscal correction. This debt will be difficult to reduce because the permanent loss of potential output means that government revenue may have to be permanently lowered.
Ireland: role model for austerity or not?
Is Ireland the role model for austerity? The logic and empirical foundation of expansionary fiscal contractions is shaky, at best. The experience of the 1980s in Ireland shows that it is possible to reduce fiscal expenditure in a small open economy openly courting foreign direct investment with friendly taxation rates when the rest of the world is growing and one is receiving transfers from other states whilst reducing costly unemployment through emigration.
It is hard to see Ireland recovering in the short term as a result of austerity measures alone. Their short term deflationary impact can be absorbed.
It is the long run effects alluded to in the BIS study that are cause for concern.
Following a debt--financed asset price bubble however, with firm, household, and bank deleveraging, credit constraints on non--autonomous private investment and a government committed to austerity policies, sluggish growth seems to be the most likely outcome for the Irish economy. We are not a role model, but a cautionary tale.
